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I. Introduction 
In the process that has come to be called the "construc-
tion of knowledge," what is it, exactly, that gets made? How 
much control over the product do the "constructors" actually 
have? And to what extent is that which is "known," i.e., the 
product of the inquiry, dependent upon that which is outside 
the control of the knowledge seekers? 
One might take it that the pragmatic view on these 
matters could be readily summed up, in the following, 
simplified, theses: 
1. Knowledge is made, not discovered. 
2. Knowledge, a product of contingent human efforts in 
unique concrete situations, is neither general nor secure, 
nor can anything be known with certainty. 
3. There is no 'antecedent reality' that exists prior to being 
known, which determines what can come to be known. 
These theses seem to be widely taken as part and parcel of a 
classical pragmatic interpretation of epistemology and 
ontology, to be views that Dewey would have endorsed. This, 
I would take it, would be a "popular" account of a pragmatic 
view of "knowing and the known." 
I have argued at length elsewhere1 that each one of these 
statements is wrong, that, taken together, they constitute a 
caricature of a Deweyan epistemology, and that a philosophi-
cal pragmatist has strong reasons, generated within the 
pragmatic tradition, for rejecting each and every one of these 
claims. The argument is that pragmatic inquiry, of the sort 
explicated most thoroughly by Dewey, requires a grounding 
in an ontological realism of the sort most thoroughly expli-
cated by Peirce. Without such grounding, passages in Dewey 
can be taken as indicating a view very much like a modern 
Idealism, i.e., there is no antecedent reality to be known—an 
interpretation which Dewey emphatically disavowed. The 
associated claim is that Dewey did indeed set out the required 
ontolgical thesis, contrary to currently popular accounts. In 
short, neither Dewey nor Peirce would have endorsed the 
above theses, and that the view represented in this version of 
"pragmatism" is implausible and should be revised. For there 
is a missing element, that when set in place changes the pic-
ture considerably. And that missing element, to paraphrase 
Peirce, is Reality. 
The claim I've made is that there is an often overlooked 
ontological realism2 that is properly associated with the 
Deweyan pragmatic inquiry, the implication of which is that 
"what" might be discovered in inquiry, what might be known, 
is in an important sense set in advance, and is independent of 
the beliefs, hopes and preferences of the inquirer(s). 
The "production of knowledge," in virtue of this external 
limiting determination, is indeed the production of that which 
is stable, secure, general, and, in one very important sense, 
"transcendent" of the concrete particulars of its originating 
conditions. 
This is a rather controversial thesis. In explicating it 
further here, I shall examine several crucial issues, develop-
ing what I take to be the best "Deweyan" interpretations, and 
set these in contrast to the contrary positions on a "Deweyan 
real ism" advanced recently by Cunningham and by 
Garrison. 
II. On the Alteration of the Known, by the very 
act of Knowing 
Does act of knowing alter what is known, and if so, how? 
Cunningham sets out clearly the view that is here contested. 
He writes "...by engaging with brute events in the process of 
inquiry, inquirers alter reality by conferring upon events 
attributes which were not previously there. Reality is not 
'mind-independent'; rather, mind and reality are intricately 
interwoven...."3 There are several senses in which such a 
claim is quite simply true, and eminently in keeping with 
Deweyan pragmatism. For one, it is quite true, albeit in a 
trivial sense, that the process of knowing "changes" the 
unknown fact into the fact-known. The "unknown fact" here 
should be understood as a true contrary-to-fact conditional, 
i.e., If it were the case that operation x were to be undertaken 
in the situation, an alteration a in the situation would occur. 
This unknown fact comes to be known when (and only when) 
the operation is in fact undertaken and alteration a is observed 
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to occur. The "s i tua t ion" is to be understood here 
transactionally, i.e., to include the agent within the situation— 
in this sense, the behaviors of the agent, including the cogni-
tive behaviors, are simply one aspect of the situation, each as 
fully real as any other. When the agent takes overt action, it 
is certainly true that the situation undergoes change. What 
undergoes no change, though, is the truth of the contrary-to-
fact conditional, the truth of which arises from the existential 
facts of the situation. 
A second, somewhat more substantive sense the 
"alteration of reality" can be developed, which would leave 
us, again, with a true statement. Consider that, for Dewey, 
that which is, or might be, known is neither a "thing," nor a 
quality of things, but rather a connection between and among 
things and qualities. Dewey writes, 
Things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable, not 
because they are remote or behind some impenetrable veil of 
sensation of ideas, but because knowledge has no concern with 
them. For knowledge is a memorandum of conditions of their 
appearance, concerned, that is, with sequences, coexistences, 
relationsA (italics added) 
In the process of coming to know, a brand-new connection of 
sorts is forged, between knower and known. In knowing, the 
person is newly equipped with an effective cognitive tool, a 
means for actively intervening in new ways in the existential 
situation. So, in this sense, the ongoing situation is indeed 
changed. And, since the new relations between knower and 
the rest of the situation are as fully real as any other set of 
relations, we may truly say that there has occurred a change, 
a growth in "what is," a growth in reality. This growth in the 
connections that obtain between existents, and hence growth 
in what "is," is infinite. So, in every act of knowing, the 
world is indeed "changed," in this limited sense. 
But, it is again important to note what is not changed by 
the act of knowing. What is not changed by the knowing are 
the connections, the sequences, the relations among existen-
tial things, the "conditions of appearance," that themselves 
have come to be known. This is because those known con-
nections are "real," which is to say that they exist indepen-
dently of any knower, and hence the act of knowing is inca-
pable of affecting in any way the connections that are, or 
may come to be, known. 
I have employed here Peirce's sense of the meaning of 
the term 'real'. One might well question whether that is 
legitimate, whether Dewey would have, or did, adopt 
a similar sense. The claim made here is that those connec-
tions are real for both Peirce and for Dewey, although that 
realistic aspect is seldom stated explicitly by Dewey. The 
question of the relation for Dewey between "reality" and what 
is known, and whether Dewey follows Peirce in this matter, 
must be taken up. 
"Reality," Its Relation to Truth and Knowledge, 
for Peirce and Dewey 
Peirce very emphatically states the relationship between 
knowledge of reality, and reality itself, debunking in his own 
inimitable style the notion that the knowing act can alter real 
objects. He writes, 
It appears that there are certain mummified pedants who have 
never waked to the truth that the act of knowing a real object 
alters it. They are curious specimens of humanity, and, as I am 
one of them, it may be amusing to see how I think. It seems 
that our oblivion to this truth is due to our not having made the 
acquaintance of a new analysis that the True is simply that in 
cognition which is Satisfactory. ^  
Peirce here clearly rejects a Jamesian conception of truth. 
Peirce's own view on the meaning of "truth" is based upon, 
and makes quite clear, his underlying ontological realism. 
Peirce reprises the thesis originally presented in "The Fixa-
tion of Belief," setting out his view of the relation reality to 
truth: 
My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition 
that the agitation of a question ceases when satisfaction is 
attained with the settlement of belief...goes on to consider how 
the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle 
under the action of experience; beginning with willful belief, 
or self-mendacity, the most degraded of all intellectual condi-
tions; thence rising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority 
of organized society; then to the idea of a settlement of opinion 
as the result of a fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching 
the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in 
experience as the effect of an independent reality(italics 
added) 
Central to Peirce's conception of truth is the effect on 
the inquirer of an "independent reality"—a redundant phrase, 
actually, for in Peirce's view, that which is real is simply that 
which is what it is and has the characteristics it has, regard-
less of anyone's thoughts about the matter, regardless even 
of everyone 's thoughts. If "truth" is determined by the real 
facts, and those are independent of human belief, then truth 
itself is independent of human belief. 
Does this represent a "pragmatic" thesis? As it is drawn 
directly from a careful reading of Peirce, it certainly repre-
sents a "pragmaticistic" thesis, and would have to be accepted 
as "pragmatic" to whatever extent one accepts Peirce as 
"pragmatic." It is definitely not a Jamesian thesis. But is it a 
Deweyan one? This is a bit hard to determine, since in 
Dewey's writing one readily can find references to the need 
to reject "Reals," and "Reality." Taken in context, it gener-
ally is clear that this rejection is only of a "Reality" construed 
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as a separate and superior, complete and final Realm, 
existing in splendid isolation from the mundane world of 
human experience. This is not the sense in which Peirce uses 
the term reality; his is a much more straightforward sense. In 
Peirce's conception, human beings, and all their experiences 
and behaviors, including actions, perceptions and thoughts, 
are as full real as any other sort of event. There is no 
postulation of a "separate" realm of superior Reality. Instead, 
we see in Peirce simply a natural, common-sense ontological 
realism. 
How close is Dewey to Peirce, on the issue of a natural-
istic common-sense realism? Dewey seems to make the 
matter reasonably clear, in an article entitled, "The Realism 
of Pragmatism." He writes: "Speaking of the matter only for 
myself, the presuppositions and tendencies of pragmatism 
are dist inctly rea l i s t ic . " 7 Later, Dewey concludes, 
"Instrumentalism is thus thoroughly realistic as to the objec-
tive or fulfi l l ing conditions of knowledge...psychical 
things...stand for and thus accomplish what things would 
accomplish—viz., mutually realistic significance—if they [the 
things] were only there."** 
That is, for Dewey there is a relationship of "realistic 
significance" that obtains among things; and, when one or 
more of those things are absent, as is typically the case in a 
problem-situation, we employ psychical "stand-ins," ideas, 
in their place. The fulfilling conditions of knowledge—which 
test the truth of the claim—are objective; the things we are 
working with have, or do not have, the significance we 
attribute to them in thought, and our ideas "pan out," or they 
do not, accordingly. 
Dewey gives us an example of knowledge, wherein 
"smells...become the object of knowledge," and concludes: 
Just and only because odors (or any group of qualities) are 
parts of a connected world are they signs of things beyond them-
selves; and only because they are signs is it profitable and 
necessary to study them as if they were complete, self-enclosed 
entities. In the reflective determination of things with 
reference to their specifically meaning other things, experiences 
of fulfilment, disappointment and going astray inevitably play 
an important and recurrent role. They also are realistic facts, 
related in realistic ways to the things that intend to mean other 
things and to the things intended. 
Here again we have reference to the naturalistic ontological 
realism as a position that is basic to Dewey's conception of 
the knowing relation. We have not only "real" things, but 
real relations, connections, between things. 
The question of the sort of realism properly associated 
with Deweyan pragmatism has been taken up recently by 
Garrison. Although Garrison sets out on an important task, 
to present educational researchers with an overview of the 
realism and its implications for our understanding of knowl-
edge, some of the common misunderstandings may well 
result inadvertantly from Garrison's explication. For 
Garrison tells us early on that Dewey "held a constructivist 
view of knowledge," and a "doctrine of humankind as truth 
maker."10 And such phrases lend themselves to an exagger-
ated view of the role of human thought in "determining" what 
shall be true, and thence what shall be known. 
Garrison sets out Dewey's principal theses succinctly and 
accurately. But there is one juncture at which a significant 
error creeps in. Garrison sets out an interpretation of Peirce's 
position on reals, which he then attempts to distinguish sharply 
from Dewey's. Garrison notes that Dewey followed Peirce 
in "preserv[ing] a notion of 'objective reference', 11 but then 
asserts that Dewey "rejected...Peirce's objectivism, his alle-
giance to the existence of fixed eternal structures, for example, 
essences and necessary natural laws, 'fated' in advance to be 
found by continued inquiry."12 Yet recourse to the article in 
question, Dewey's "The Pragmatism of Peirce,"13 shows that 
this is not quite the case. 
Indeed, in the very paragraph Garrison has cited, Dewey 
endorses a view of the nature of inquiry, reality and truth 
different in no essential respect from that of Peirce. The 
relevant passage from Dewey, is: 
Finally, both Peirce and James are realists. The reasonings of 
both depend upon the assumption of real things which really 
have effects or consequences. Of the two, Peirce makes clearer 
the fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the 
conception of reality, with reality as a term having rational 
purport, and hence with something whose meaning is itself to 
be determined in terms of consequences. That 'reality' means 
the object of those beliefs which have, after prolonged and 
cooperative inquiry, become stable, and 'truth' the quality of 
these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position.1^ 
Note well that the consequences seen in human practice, 
which constitute the meaning of the term 'reality' according 
to the pragmatic maxim, depend upon the ontological assump-
tion of "real things which really have effects or consequences." 
It is an objective reality that "forces" our inquiry towards 
certain conclusions. It is in the penultimate sentence of this 
paragraph that Dewey obliquely endorses the Peircean 
position. He writes, 
And while my purpose is wholly expository, I can not close 
without inquiring whether recourse to Peirce would not have a 
most beneficial influence in contemporary discussion. Do not 
a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an 
attempt to define the 'real' as something given prior to 
reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is 
forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can 
stably cling?1 ^  (emphsis added) 
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The second, commended view is that of Peirce; so, it is 
clearly not Peirce whom Dewey excoriates here as propo-
nent of the notorious "philosophic fallacy" of "givens"! It is 
that old opponent, the "classic" traditional philosophy, the 
philosophy which accepts the "given-ness" to "Mind" of 
"Truth," via "Intuition" and/or "Reason." Both Dewey and 
Peirce are decisively rejecting that long-standing philosophic 
fallacy. 
Consider the meaning here of the term 'given'. 'Given' 
does not mean "existing" prior to inquiry—rather, it means 
acquired/attained/received directly by the mind. Dewey holds 
that the notion of "Mind," as a special sort of thing existing 
in a peculiar realm of its own, blessed with ability to acquire 
knowledge of truths, as "givens," by some special, non-ex-
periential capacity peculiar to itself, is nonsense. He rejects 
any and all claims that, in this sense, knowledge of anything 
is "given," prior to the activity of reflective inquiry. It is in 
this sense that Dewey rejects the "attempt to define the 'real' 
as something given prior to reflective inquiry..." Dewey main-
tains instead that we should define the "real," as Peirce did, 
as "that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach, and to 
which, when it is reached, belief can stably cling..."16 Key 
words to note here: forced to reach— 
inquiry is said here, by Dewey, to be "forced to reach" some-
thing, and that something is that which is "real." "Belief' is 
able to stably cling to that real thing. It is abundantly clear 
that inquiry is a human activity, and, as such, it will proceed, 
or not proceed, as those humans engaged in it decide. But, if 
the inquiry does proceed, and proceeds long enough, and if it 
is genuine, it will find itself "forced" to reach certain conclu-
sions. Or, more precisely, we who are engaged in the inquiry 
will find ourselves forced to reach certain conclusions. What 
is it that could force upon us, whether we will it or no, certain 
conclusions? Peirce puts it well—"the new concept here 
involved is Reality."17 Dewey seems here to be simply 
endorsing the Peircean view. 
So Garrison is correct to note that Dewey here endorses 
some sort of realism. But he is incorrect to see this as a 
repudiation of Peirce, and incorrect to see Dewey as in some 
degree conflat ing, if not equating, "objectivity" and 
"solidarity." It is not the case that objectivity is, or "involves" 
solidarity. Rather, it is the objectivity of the real that (one 
may hope) leads to the eventual happy outcome of a human 
solidarity in belief. Provided, of course, that we do choose to 
engage in that process of inquiry. One may well wonder 
whether Dewey's later views continue in this vein—that they 
do, will I hope become clear in the course of this study. 
The "Immediate " Becomes the "Generic" 
There is a third sense in which the activity of knowing 
might be construed as introducing a "change." Dewey writes 
that the "practical arts" represent the first groping steps in 
knowing, in "defining spatial and temporal qualities, 
transforming purely immediate qualities of local things into 
generic relationships."1^ That is, when we come to know, 
that which was for us experienced initially as purely imme-
diate, a had or a felt experience, becomes "transformed" for 
us, through our taking of practical actions, into a thing with 
significance, a thing which points to something else, and in 
that sense is not "final." The "transformation," in this sense, 
is of our relationship to the other thing(s), from a primary to 
a secondary sort of experience, as we come to see the thing in 
its general connections in the world. But, note that we are 
not the creators of that generic significance. We are, as 
before, the discoverers of the real significance that the 
existential thing has actually had, all along. Indeed, Dewey 
writes that "the life-blood of modern science [the paradigm 
for Dewey of "knowing"] is discovery."'9 
We have established so far that the objects of knowledge 
are connections, connections that can be used by us in 
deliberately altering existential situations. The objects of 
knowledge are "an order of relations which serve as tools to 
effect immediate havings and beings." 20 (italics added) And, 
"physical science...reveals the state or order upon which the 
occurrence of immediate and final qualities depends."^1 
But we can take this one step further. These "ordered 
relationships," in Dewey's words, constitute " a mathemati-
cal , m e c h a n i c a l — o r if you p l e a s e — l o g i c a l order.. ."22 
Further, 
the instrumental nature of objects of knowledge accounts for 
the central position of laws, relations. These are the formula-
tions of the regularities upon which intellectual and other 
regulation of things as immediate apparitions 
depends....elements vary independently of one another, but not 
independently of a relation to others, the relation or law being 
the constancy among variations. ...The inevitable consequence 
[of establishing a "knowing" relation] is the subjection of 
individuals or unique modes of variation to external relations, 
to laws of uniformity; that is to say, the elimination of 
individuality. Bear in mind the instrumental nature of the 
relation of elements, and this abrogation of individuality merely 
means a temporary neglect...in behalf of attending to condi-
tions under which individualities present themselves.23 (ital-
ics in original) 
According to Cunningham, a Deweyan pragmatic 
account of knowing requires of us a focus on the "here-and 
now," in space and time. Cunningham's claim is that knowl-
edge is of the particular, the concrete, for "[w]e are always in 
the circumstances we are in, and we can never be in a cir-
cumstance that we are not in. We are always in our own 
place in space and time. We can never test a knowledge claim 
except in the actual circumstances that define the boundaries 
of our lives."24 But this is precisely what Dewey rejects as 
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characteristic of the "knowing" relation. In the process of 
"knowing," we must establish an awareness of connections 
that are "out of time." And this is precisely the phrase Dewey 
uses. 
Timeless laws...are methods, and when applied as methods they 
regulate the precarious flow of unique situations. Events 
change; one individual gives place to another. But individu-
ally qualified things have some qualities which are pervasive, 
common, stable. They are out of time in the sense that a 
particular temporal quality is irrelevant to them. If any body 
feels relieved by calling them eternal, let them be called 
eternal...[which is to denote the] irrelevance to existence in its 
temporal quality. These non-temporal, mathematical or 
logical qualities are capable of abstraction, and of conversion 
into relations, into temporal, numerical and spatial order 
(italics in original) 
And, Dewey continues, "...this order, which is to be discov-
ered by inquiry and confirmed by experimental action, is the 
proper object of knowledge."2^ 
So, it appears that the process of coming to know is for 
Dewey not only a matter of discovering that which is real, 
which is to say, connections which are independent of hu-
man thinking or knowing. It is a process of discovering real 
general relations, laws, the "constancy among variations." 
It is important to note that these real relations are not prop-
erly termed 'existents'—that is, we have no need whatsoever 
to postulate, with the Greeks, a realm of what Dewey calls 
"absolute perduring existence or Being"27 wherein these re-
lations might somehow "exist" as a "Truer Reality"—but the 
general relations are nonetheless real, in the suggested 
Peircean sense. 
Cunningham quotes Dewey in a passage that would seem 
to counter the claim made here. "Knowledge or science, as a 
work of art, like any other work of art, confers upon things 
traits and potentialities which did not previously belong to 
them..."28 But, Dewey makes it very clear in the passage 
that he is saying nothing to alarm the genuine natural real-
ist—he specifies that one is required to be very careful of 
one's tenses: 
Knowledge is not a distortion or perversion which confers upon 
its subject-matter traits which do not belong to it, but is {as 
Cunningham continues the quote}...an act which confers upon 
non-cognitive material traits which did not belong to 
it....Architecture does not add to stone and wood something 
which does not belong to them, but it does add to them proper-
ties and efficacies which they did not possess in their earlier 
state. It adds them by means of engaging them in new modes 
of interaction, having a new order of consequences.2^ (italics 
in original) 
That is, brute events, which previously had any number of 
connections, but did not have connections to humans, as 
means to accomplish human purposes, in coming to be known 
come to have such connections. These relations to human 
lives are themselves real. Dewey writes: "experiences of 
fulfilment, disappointment and going astray...are realistic facts 
related in realistic ways to the things that intend to mean other 
things...' 3 0 Further, 
[w]hen these fulfilments and refusals are reflected upon in the 
determinate relations in which they stand to their relevant mean-
ings, they obtain a quality which is quite lacking to them in 
their immediate occurrence as just fulfilments or disappoint-
ments; viz., the property of affording assurance and correction— 
of confirming and refuting.31 
So, what is forged is a brand-new set of human-to-otherthing 
relationships, as we recognize the safety (or lack thereof) in 
employing the thing as a sign, of engaging in activities that 
depend for their success on that discovered significance. 
A fourth sense of "change in reality" is the most funda-
mental for Deweyan epistemology. What changes, most ob-
viously, when knowing enters the picture, is the actual, on-
going, objective state of affairs. It is the future course of 
experience that changes as a result of the "knowing" activity. 
For, at this point, when knowledge of (non-cognitive) events/ 
things is established, that new set of connections between a) 
human events and purposes, and b) non-cognitive events is 
created. And this leads to an existential alteration in the course 
of the developing situation. Specifically, that which happens, 
given the new connections, the knowledge, is different than 
that which would have happened, without the knowledge. 
But this is only to say that knowledge is a tool, a real and 
effective tool, that it can be and often is used to alter real 
conditions. And this is the fundamental sense in which "know-
ing" introduces "changes" in the real world, in a Deweyan 
epistemology. 
As there is no end to the growth of real "connections of 
human use" over time, there is no end to the growth of knowl-
edge, and no end to the changing reality, and, particularly, no 
end to the changes in future states of affairs. In Dewey's 
words, 
The increments of meaning which things are constantly taking 
on is as much the product of psychical existences, as the added 
significance of words is the result of their use in propositions, 
i.e., with a context. They [psychical existences, e.g., ideas] are 
the media of effecting the transformation of conflicting, unsat-
isfactory, and consequently fragmentarily significant situations, 
into situations where things are surely and reciprocally... sig-
nificant of one another. Hence the free, the indeterminate, the 
growing, the potential factor in reality.32 (italics in original) 
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The Fictive and the Real 
So, to recap—we have seen that the knowing relation 
occurs with person ' s recognit ion of the real 
interconnectedness of the things/events in the world, particu-
larly when general relations among things can be discovered. 
But we must draw a sharp distinction between a) relations 
that are real, and b) those that are fictive. Only the former 
can properly said to be "known"; only the latter can properly 
said to be "given" by us to the things or events into which we 
inquire. 
Cunningham sets out clearly the (potentially) problem-
atic point, quoting Dewey: "the business of reflection is to 
take events which brutely occur and brutely affect us, to con-
vert them into objects by means of inference as to their prob-
able consequences. These are the meanings imputed to the 
events under consideration."33 There is a sense in which we, 
in the processes of knowing, "convert brute events into ob-
jects, by means of inference as to their probable conse-
quences." To understand this sense, we must note that Dewey 
has established a stipulated meaning for the term 'object'. 
An object is to be understood as, simply, "an event with mean-
ing." Given this, it is merely tautological to state that, in (meta-
phorically) attaching a "meaning," i.e., a significance, a stable 
connection with other events, to some event, we ipso facto 
"convert" the event into an "object." 
But, if there is to be knowledge, that meaning, that im-
puted significance, must be real, which is to say, it must be a 
discovered meaning. We, by our own powers, cannot in any 
way "add" real, objective significance to (non-social) events. 
We can add whatever fictive significance we desire, of course, 
and often do. But, such a move cannot give us knowledge, 
because such fictive significance cannot fulfill the office of 
knowledge, namely, to provide secure means of predicting 
and controlling future events. That office can only be ful-
filled when "knowledge" is taken to be restricted to a con-
sciousness of real relations. Dewey writes that "while there 
is no knowing without perception of meaning, yet...having 
meanings and rolling them over as sweet morsels under the 
tongue...[is]...not knowing."34 Note that Dewey explicitly 
states, in the passage Cunningham quotes above, that it is the 
probable consequences of the brute events that constitute the 
meanings we, properly, impute to them. And in doing so, we 
develop, from the brute events, "scientific-objects," having 
"cognitive meaning," which can be tested objectively for 
validity or lack thereof. Dewey consistently maintains the 
necessity of discovering real connections to find a meaning 
in the event, and thus to know "event" as an "object." He 
says: 
note that bare occurrence in the way of having, being, or 
undergoing is the provocation and invitation to thought—seek-
ing and finding unapparent connections, so that thinking 
terminates when an object is present...when a challenging event 
is endowed with stable meanings through relationship to some-
thing extrinsic but connected.3- (emphasis added) 
"Knowing," for Dewey, requires that one check that those 
meanings "imputed" to events have indeed been discovered, 
and are not imagined or "fanciful." And one performs these 
checks by engaging oneself, as a participant, in the objective 
series of events. One acts on the assumption of the reality of 
the hypothesized connection, the imputed significance. And 
one observes the success, or failure, of that action to produce 
the anticipated change in the existential situation. When it 
comes to one's simple, "gross" ideas, one need do no more in 
the way of action than to simply live life—one will then ob-
serve such fundamental connections as that water slakes thirst, 
and food satisfies hunger. For the testing of more complex 
ideas of meanings, one requires the more complex resources 
of a community. In such complex situations, 
effective participation [in the events] ...depends upon the use 
of extra-organic conditions...namely, tools and other persons, 
by means of language spoken and recorded. Thus the ultimate 
buttress of the soundness of all but the simplest ideas consists 
in the cumulative objective appliances and arts of the commu-
nity...36 
These objective appliances, e.g., thermometers, electron 
microscopes, cyclotrons, are "the indispensable tools of 
checking spontaneous beliefs and developing sound ones in 
their place.37 And 
without such objective resources to direct the manner of en-
gaging in responsive adaptations, ideas...are at the mercy of 
any peculiarity of organic constitution and of circumstance; 
myths are rife and the world is peopled with fabulous person-
ages and is the home of occult forces.3^ 
Note that it is not the community's "solidarity" in belief 
that is required in order to sanction knowledge claims. Rather, 
it is the complex, sophisticated apparatus that is required, 
and the development of such a thing requires the resources 
and activities, and the time, of more than one person. It is the 
collective, cooperative, and communicated experience of the 
members of the community in a cumulative objective action 
that is required to support a knowledge claim. 
The view that in the process of "knowledge construc-
tion," the community or the individual agent, through a cre-
ative act of his, her, or their mind(s), generates a "meaning" 
de novo in nature, and imbues static matter with a signifi-
cance it did not have before, comes perilously close to pre-
cisely the "modern idealism" that Dewey argued consistently 
against. Consider Dewey's judgment on the fundamental error 
of modern epistemological idealism: 
Education and Culture Fall, 1996 Vol. XIII No. 2 
24 CHRIS MCCARTHY 
modern idealistic theories of knowledge...have apprehended 
the fact that the object of knowledge implies that the found, 
rather than the given is the proper subject matter of science. 
Recognizing the part played by intelligence in this finding, they 
have framed a theory of the constitutive operation of mind in 
the determination of real objects. But idealism...has mistrans-
lated the discovery....It is not thought...which exercises the 
reconstructive function. Only action, interaction, can change 
or remake objects.(emphasis added) 
Note well that Dewey here rejects the "theory of the 
constitutive operation of the mind in the determination of 
real objects." This does not bode well for the thesis set out 
by Garrison, among others, that Dewey accepts a 
constructivist theory of knowledge, with "human beings as 
truth makers,"40 such that "meanings are made through 
cooperative behavior."41 Objects are made by human 
beings, frequently by human beings acting together in 
concert, in communication. But the cognitive meaning that 
objects have is a relation, or set of relations, holding among 
things/events,that must be discovered by the active process 
of thinking. 
Moreover, in this passage we see, most clearly stated, 
Dewey's view as to the "reconstructive" relations of knowl-
edge. Knowledge is a means by which the objective 
problematic situation existing at one moment in time is 
transformed, by the actions of an agent possessing the 
knowledge, into an improved, more desired objective 
situation at some later moment. And this new situation is 
other than it would have been, had not the agent intervened 
with his or her action. This is the full sense of the 
"reconstruction of experience." Knowledge possession 
permits a productive, and actual, objective change, in a 
predictable direction, to be made in future existential situa-
tions. It is in this simple way that "the world is altered" by 
knowledge. The world is changed, but in the ordinary, 
everyday way, by the actions of the agent, making use of his 
or her knowledge. 
Does the pragmatist learn anything through the thinking 
process of the nature of the "antecedent" reality, of that which 
existed prior to the process? Dewey takes up this very issue, 
as it was raised by McGilvary's critique of Dewey's Studies 
in Logical Theory. McGilvary interprets Dewey as 
insisting] that the object of thought, when it has emerged from 
the experience of stress and strain and appears in a subsequent 
tranquil experience as the result of pragmatic adjustment, must 
not be read back anachronistically into the time preceding the 
adjustment. The reader was therefore left to infer that no truth 
made out by intellectual labor is to be held valid of anything 
real that may have existed before that labor was ended.42 
Dewey's response? "The reader was not only left to 'infer' 
this, the reader who did infer it was ' l e f t . ' " 4 3 Dewey 
explains that 
all thinking is reflective, and that it is constitutive not of reality 
per se or at large, but only of such reality as has been reorga-
nized through specific thinking, the reorganization finally 
taking place through an action in which the thinking 
terminates and by which it is tested. Thought is thus conceived 
of as a control-phenomenon, biological in origin, humane, 
practical, or moral in import, involving it its issue real 
transformation of real reality. Hence the text [Studies in 
Logical Theory] abounds in assertions of reality existing prior 
to thinking, prior to coming to know...44 
Dewey concludes with the reiteration that it is the 
"organic issue of thinking," that is to say, action, that serves 
the "reconstructive" function. This function is no different 
than any other reorganization of the natural world, by human 
and non-human alike. 
"Meaning " vs. "Meaning " 
What then of the common claim that, for a pragmatist, 
"meaning" is a social product, a thing not discovered, but 
made? Are there not a superabundance of passages in Dewey 
that clearly say just this? That we ourselves selectively add 
meaning to the events we experience, and in the process 
create our own specialized, culture-specific, personalized 
knowledges? To be sure. But there are problems that attend 
the word 'meaning'. 
Dewey himself takes note of such problems. He writes: 
"...meaning has in philosophical usage become neither fowl, 
flesh nor good red herring. Only one who has familiarity 
with the literature of the subject can even begin to be aware 
of how confusing, obfuscating, and boring in its multiplicity 
of elaborations the word 'meaning' has become."4^ Dewey 
goes on, though, to commend the usage of 'meaning' as a 
term complementary to the term 'significance'. When events/ 
things are recognized by an agent as significant, i.e., as 
indicators of what is to be expected, then the agent is able to 
engage in "meaningful" action. "Meaning," in this sense, 
names a "way or mode of skilled ways of organized action."46 
The key point raised here is the necessity of carefully 
distinguishing between "meaning" understood as objective 
significance, "meaning" understood as a characteristic of lin-
guistic signs, i.e., as "de-signation," and "meaning" under-
stood as a characteristic of intentional intelligent action. As 
a characteristic of a linguistic sign, "meaning" is indeed for 
Dewey a culturally determined artifact, a selection from the 
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many objective meanings possible, or even a cultural 
creation. It is given by human agents to the term, and both 
linguistic sign and its referent are "created" in one and the 
same set of behavioral activities. This is the case both for 
ordinary language in common usage, and for scientific ter-
minology. Dewey concludes "that 'meaning' is no more in-
herent in things as 'objects' in independence of human ways 
of behaving than it is inherent in the sounds and marks that 
are upon occasion surrogates for things in human behavior 
when the things are not directly present."47 
The term 'meaning' often appears in this sense in 
Dewey's writing. For example, in Experience and Nature, 
Dewey writes: "Meanings do not come into being without 
language, and language implies two selves involved in a 
conjoint or shared undertaking."4^ But note well that Dewey 
is here talking about linguistic meanings, meanings of words, 
meanings of the same sort that one might well choose to 
explicate by application of the pragmatic maxim. Linguistic 
meanings are human artifacts, creations of ourselves in com-
munication. They are quintessentially arbitrary, they can be 
whatever we want. (Provided only that there is some 
relevant "we" to participate in the communication—"at least 
two beings" are required.) So, when we "understand," it is 
one another that we understand. Or, more precisely, it is one 
another's meanings that we understand. And that is to say 
(the pragmatic maxim applied) we understand one another's 
conceptions of the practical effects to be expected. And, by 
this use of language, we find our ongoing cooperative 
activities much facilitated. 
Garrison sets out clearly the Deweyan concept of 
linguistic meaning, but neglects to distinguish this "mean-
ing" from the other "meaning," i.e., objective significance. 
We do find, in linguistic practices, the social construction of 
meanings, the social construction of language. But it is a 
great, and unwarranted, leap, to assert that in Dewey's 
analysis of l inguistic meaning, we also find Dewey 
endorsing the "social construction of reality."49 
"Meaning," for Dewey, is oftentimes not the same as 
"meaning," strangely enough. Language, words, have mean-
ing, but it is things/events that have objective meaning. Con-
sider the following passage: 
There are things that claim to mean other experiences; in which 
the trait of meaning other objects is not discovered ab extra, 
and after the event, but is part of the thing itself. This trait of 
the thing is as realistic, as specific, as any other of its traits. It 
is, therefore, as open to inspection and determination as to its 
nature, as is any other trait. Moreover...it is upon this trait that 
assurance.. .depends. ^ 
We must note clearly the qualifier that attaches to the 
claim that this sort of "meaning" is "not discovered." 
According to Dewey, the "trait of meaning other objects" is 
"not discovered ab extra" it is, rather "part of the thing 
itself." The sense of this passage clearly is that this sort of 
meaning is to be discovered, and to be discovered not only 
within the situation, but to be discovered in the situation in 
precisely the same fashion as every other real trait of the things 
in the situation are to be discovered. So we have here a 
"discovery" of meaning in a very strong sense. And further, 
we have the claim that the reality of the "meaning" of things 
is the very fact upon which the assurance of scientific 
knowledge rests. 
Now, it is certainly clear that Dewey did not consistently 
set out this view of meaning, as the first passages above 
attests. And given the fact that the two different usages are 
seldom clearly demarcated, it remains difficult to say in 
particular text passages precisely which sense is meant, 
except when the context makes it clear. There are places, 
though, where the two sorts of meaning are explicity distin-
guished. For example, in "The Logic of Judgments of Prac-
tice," Dewey explains the point. 
There is a great difference between meaning and a meaning. 
Meaning is simply a function of the situation: this thing means 
that thing; meaning is this relationship. A meaning is some-
thing quite different; it is not a function, but a specific entity, a 
peculiar thing...[that] may be used as a substitute for the thing 
inferred.^ 1 (italics in original) 
"Meaning" is an objective, real relationship among 
things; "A meaning" is "an entity in reasoning," a "concep-
tion," an "idea." And, "a meaning" is a newly created ob-
ject, of a peculiar sort, but not peculiar because "mental." 
Dewey explicitly notes the ordinary, natural, physical nature 
of a meaning: 
A sound or a visible mark is the ordinary mechanism for pro-
ducing such a new object. Whatever the physical means em-
ployed, we now have a new object; a term, a meaning, a no-
tion, an essence, a form or species...Such objects do not walk 
or bite or scratch, but they are nevertheless actually present as 
the vital agencies of reflection. 
A meaning is simply a tool to be used in the act of draw-
ing inferences about objective meaning. These passages are 
clearly consistent with the claim that in the process of know-
ing, through the use of "meanings" (the plural of a meaning) 
we discover relationships that exist prior to our knowing, and 
these discovered relationships are the "meanings" (plural of 
"meaning") of the objects in the situation. This second sort 
of meaning is an entirely objective interpretation of mean-
ing. Now, this is Dewey, not Peirce. But the position is quite 
consistent with Peirce's objective account of meaning, not at 
all the rejection that Garrrison attributes to Dewey. To the 
contrary, we find in Dewey's position a "significance," and a 
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meaning, that is real—"The instrumental theory acknowledges 
the objectivity of meanings as well as of data. 
Of course, it is human beings who do the inquiring, who 
frame the questions, fund the research, see the implications, 
who have knowledge (perhaps), and what knowledge 
they/we have is determined by what inquiries are entered into. 
So, in this sense, the product of the search is a human 
product, dependent on the human process of seeking. But, 
what is found out in those human inquiries must be meanings 
that are real, if knowledge is to exist. The content of knowl-
edge, that which is known by the agent, must be determined 
by that which is outside, other than, the agent. Dewey writes, 
...as cognitional or intellectual, it is surely the business, so to 
say, of consciousness to be determined...solely in and through 
objects. Otherwise common sense is crazy and science an 
organized insanity...We have something which is beyond 
consciousness as cognitional and which determines conscious-
ness as cognitional—literally determines it...and logically 
determines it, in that the content of knowledge must conform 
to conditions which the knowledge consciousness does not 
itself supply.55 
Pragmatic Realism, Truth and Knowledge 
Many modern pragmatists consider it a cornerstone of 
pragmatic thought that "truth" is not to be interpreted in terms 
of a correspondence of belief with fact. In Rorty's version of 
pragmatism—see, for example, Objectivity. Relativism and 
Truth—he speaks of the pragmatists' rejecting those 
...call them realists—[who] have to construe truth as correspon-
dence to reality...[who] must construct a metaphysics which 
has room for a special relation between beliefs and objects 
which will differentiate true from false beliefs...[and] must 
argue that there are procedures of justification of belief which 
are natural and not merely local. 
The ontological realism identified here allows us to 
understand truth in a way that does not resort to a Rortian 
"solidarity" and a purely "local" notion of truth. Rorty, and 
others, seem to favor a Jamesian interpretation of truth, as, in 
Rorty's words "what is good for us to believe,"57 which is 
quite far removed from Peirce's view, and from Dewey's. 
Dewey's explication of his functionalist view of logic, in the 
essay, "The Control of Ideas by Facts" supports this view. 
For example, Dewey writes: 
...a functional logic...has never for a moment denied the prima 
facie, working distinction between 'ideas', 'thought', 'mean-
ings', and 'facts', 'existences', 'the environment', and the 
necessity of a control of meaning by facts, if there is to be any 
question of truth and error.. 
Dewey goes on to the example of the man lost in the 
woods, who tests his belief that {this is the way out} by 
engaging in overt action based upon the belief, and who is 
then able to compare, directly and unproblematically, the 
actual experienced results with the anticipated results. Dewey 
writes that, on finding a 'match', 
...now, one may say, my idea was right, it was in accord with 
facts; it agrees with reality. That is, acted upon sincerely, it has 
led to the desired conclusion; it has through action, worked 
out the state of things which it contemplated or intended. 
(underline added) 
That is, after taking action, we are to compare the idea 
(the anticipated results of a proposed action) with the fact 
(the actual results of the proposed action, when taken). No 
metaphysical gymnastics are required for this comparison. 
And, when idea does in this sense "correspond" to fact, we 
may say, it is true, that action x, taken in situation A, leads to 
the development of situation B. It is in this important sense 
that beliefs, to be true, must "correspond" with facts, in a 
Deweyan epistemology. 
How, then, in light of this pragmatic realistic interpreta-
tion of "truth," should we understand "knowledge"? In 
Dewey's example above, the man first "believes" that {this 
is the way out}; after acting upon the belief, and finding a 
"correspondence" between anticipated results and experi-
enced (actual) results, the man "knows" that {this is the way 
out}. The relation of belief to fact is one that is itself "real," 
not subject to change. Although in this example, the same 
problem situation and proposed solution might never turn up 
again, if it did, the same belief would lead to the same expe-
rience, i.e., the belief continues, forever, to be "true" of that 
situation, that set of facts/relations. Whenever we have 
identified, via action, true beliefs, we have knowledge, in so 
far forth, and that knowledge, though partial, incomplete, must 
be taken as both general and as a secure basis of action, 
leading to predictable results. 
Now, such a claim will surely sound profoundly 
anti-Deweyan. But, consider Dewey's own explication: 
Every existential situation is always a unique combination of 
the stable and the precarious. But knowledge of a situation 
"goes beyond" a simple recognition of the particulars of the 
situation, to the discovery of that in it which is general, 
secure and stable, indeed, "unalterable." According to Dewey, 
...the precise and defining aim of knowledge...is to secure things 
which are permanent or stable objects of reference; which may 
be persistently employed without thereby introducing further 
conflicts. Unalterability means, precisely, capacity to enter into 
further things as secured points of regard, established contents 
and quales, guaranteed methods...knowledge arises because of 
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the inherent discrepancy and consequent alteration of things. 
But it gives that alteration a particular turn which it would not 
take without knowledge—it directs alteration toward a result 
of security and stability.6*) 
Dewey, of course, rejects the classical philosophical 
notion of a transcendent realm of pure, ideal, fixed and 
unalterable essence. But he does not fall into the all too 
common error of assuming that the "opposite" of what is 
rejected must in fact be the case; he does not assert an 
absence in the world of the secure, the stable, and the 
unalterable. It is precisely the office of inquiry to secure for 
us, for our future use, the knowledge of that which in an all 
too uncertain world, is stable and secure. And that object of 
knowledge is the objectively existing reference that obtains 
amongst existential things. Dewey writes that, while the 
classical position must be rejected, 
Yet we may admit a certain empirical transcendence. The 
outcome of the doubt-inquiry-answer experience literally goes 
beyond the state of suspense and dissentience out of which it 
originates. So far as the knowledge experience fulfills its 
functions, it permanently transcends its own originating 
conditions. It puts certain things out of doubt, rendering them 
reliable, economical and fruitful constituents in other more 
complex things. This transcendence is the very essence of the 
pragmatic empiricist's account of truth.61 
Dewey doesn't, of course, neglect to note that contin-
gency and uncertainty, and the evanescent character of events, 
is also real, a part of natural existence. But, he writes, "the 
contingencies of nature make discovery of [the] uniformities 
with a view to prediction needed and possible. Without the 
uniformities, science would be impossible."62 
Is there a method for ascertaining which particular be-
liefs belong to the "known" category? There is, but it's not 
very exciting, nor is it easy and quick—it is simply the prag-
matic method of inquiry. We are not and can never be, in a 
position, to "sneak a quick look" at the answers, to view 
directly some putative roster of real connections, and so take 
a short-cut to knowledge. But the route that we must take, 
though slow, is capable of locating those real connections, 
and thus is able to generate genuine instances of knowledge. 
This fact explains the constant ode to science that one sees, 
in both Peirce and Dewey. And, in practical affairs, we, 
none of us, I hope, doubt that there is such knowledge. That 
is, we act with confident expectations in any number of 
contexts, given our discoveries of "constancies" that may be 
relied upon, and are not disappointed. How do we distin-
guish that which is "known" from that which is not? Dewey's 
answer perhaps will suffice: 
There is no way to know what are the traits of known objects, 
as distinct from imaginary objects, or objects of opinion, or 
objects of unanalytic common-sense, save by referring to the 
operations of getting, using and testing evidence....[A]nyone 
who professes to be concerned with finding out what knowl-
edge is, has for his primary work the job of finding out why it 
is so much safer to proceed with just these objects, than with 
those, say of Aristotelian science.63 (emphsis added) 
And why is it? Peirce's answer is simple—the new con-
ception here involved is Reality. Dewey's is a bit more wordy, 
but makes the same point. Even the most abstract of our 
intellectual "creations," mathematical distinctions: 
...are not the creations of mind except in the sense in which a 
telephone is a creation of mind. They fit nature because they 
are derived from natural conditions. Things naturally bulge, 
so to speak, and naturally alter. To seize upon these qualities, 
to develop them into keys for discovering the meanings of brute, 
isolated events, and to accomplish this effectively...till they 
become economical tools...for making an unknown and uncer-
tain situation into a known and certain one, is the recorded 
triumph of human intelligence.64 
In short, given the pragmatic realism grounding the 
positions of both Peirce and Dewey, there is an antecedent 
reality, comprising "the facts," which includes real, and 
general, relations. And, these real relations, or objective 
meanings, which must be discovered, not made, constitute 
the proper objects of knowledge. 
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